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ABSTRACT 
 
THE DYNAMICS OF FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT IN TURKEY FROM 
A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 
Sönmez, Asena 
M.A., Department of International Relations 
Supervisor: Asst. Prof. Dr. W J Korab-Karpowicz 
 
September 2008 
 
In this thesis I discussed different components of foreign direct 
investment inflows from the perspective of hosting countries.  Since foreign 
direct investment has been accepted as an important tool for the 
development of economies, FDI has taken particular attention by 
governments and there has been a huge competition to attract FDI. Last years 
show an improvement in FDI attraction of Turkey which can be explained 
through commitment to liberalization, privatization and influence of EU. In 
fact reforms made to fulfill EU criteria were only one among many influences 
of EU on FDI inflows. European countries have a tendency to channel FDI 
within the borders of EU which consequently renders EU membership is an 
important advantage for attracting FDI from EU countries. Signals of this 
advantage when coupled with the geographical position of Turkey showed 
itself positively in statistics of FDI in Turkey.  To illustrate the effects of the 
relationship with the EU, I provide a comparative analysis with Romania and 
Argentina. Three of the cases-Turkey, Romania and Argentina- point out to 
 iv 
the fact that structure of the economy, privatization and liberalization, 
stability and international networks (as in the case of the EU) matter 
considerably when we discuss general trends of FDI inflows. 
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ÖZET 
 
TARİHSEL YAKLAŞIMLA TÜRKİYE’DE DOĞRUDAN YABANCI 
SERMAYE DİNAMİKLERİ 
Sönmez, Asena 
Yüksek Lisans, Uluslararası İlişkiler Bölümü 
Tez Yöneticisi: Yrd. Doç. Dr. W J Korab-Karpowicz 
 
Temmuz 2008 
 
 
Bu tezde doğrudan yabancı yatırımın yatırım alan ülkeler açısından 
farklı bileşenlerini tartıştım. Doğrudan yabancı yatırım gelişmekte olan 
ülkeler tarafından ekonomiyi geliştirmenin en önemli yollarından biri olarak 
kabul edildiğinden hükümetler yabancı yatırımı ülkelerine çekmek için 
yarışa girmiş durumdadır. Son yıllarda Türkiye’de doğrudan yabancı 
yatırımda görülen gelişmeleri liberalleşmede sebat edilmesi, özelleştirme ve 
AB’nin etkisiyle açıklamak mümkün olmakla birlikte AB kriterlerini yerine 
getirmek için yapılan reformlar AB etkilerinden sadece biri olarak 
değerlendirilebilir. Avrupa Birliği’ne üye ülkeler yatırımlarını AB sınırları 
içinde yoğunlaştırma eğilimine sahip olduklarından AB üyeliği AB üyesi 
ülkelerden yatırım almak için çok büyük bir avantaj sağlamaktadır. Bu 
avantajların sinyalleri ve Türkiye’nin konumu son bir kaç yılda olumlu 
anlamda yabancı yatırım istatistiklerine yansımaya başladı. Bu etkileri daha 
geniş bir çerçevede inceleyebilmek için Romanya ve Arjantin gibi ülkeyle 
 vi 
karşılaştırmalı bir analiz de sunmaktayım. Romanya, Arjantin ve Türkiye bir 
arada incelendiğinde ekonominin yapısı, özelleştirme, istikrar ve uluslararası 
bağlantılar (AB örneğinde olduğu gibi) yabancı yatırımı çekmekte önemli 
özellikler olarak öne çıkmaktadır.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 vii 
 
 
 
 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
 
 
I would like express my deepest gratitude to my supervisor, Asst. Prof. Dr. 
W J Korab- Karpowicz for all his valuable support and guidance during all 
the time I have been at Bilkent. He always encouraged me and helped me to 
find my way, in this journey; I owe a lot to him, including my master’s 
education. He has been a master to me more than a professor. 
 
I am also grateful to Asst. Prof. Dr. Pınar İpek, she directed me to discover 
the most important fields of International Relations during my master’s 
education. She helped me to notice that always there is something to do to 
improve the life of others.  
 
I would like to thank to Asst. Prof. Dr. Selin Sayek Böke, for taking part in 
my oral defense exam and for the precious comments of such a valuable 
member of the academic environment.  
 
I am deeply grateful to my parents for their endless support during my 
whole education.  
 
I want to thank also to my dearest friends, Sulay Sütcü and Sezen Yaraş who 
have always been supporting me, without their positive energy, this thesis 
could have never been finalized.  
 
 
 viii 
 
 
 
 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
 
ABSTRACT  ...........................................................................................................  iii 
ÖZET  ......................................................................................................................  v 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS.................................................................................  vii 
TABLE OF CONTENTS ......................................................... ............................ viii 
CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION  ...........................................................................  1                                                                                   
CHAPTER II: FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT IN TURKEY: A 
HISTORICAL FRAMEWORK  …..........................................................................  3  
2.1. Historical Background .......................................................................... 8                                                            
2.2. Contemporary Environment and Obstacles for FDI ...................... 12 
CHAPTER III: FDI IN TURKEY: POST 1999 PERIOD ..................................... 18 
  3.1. Changing World and FDI ....................................................... 20 
3.2. Profile of Turkey: An Under-Performer ............................... 23 
3.3. Structural Changes .................................................................. 29 
3.3.1. Stability ...................................................................... 32 
3.3.2. Privatization…..........................................................  33 
3.3.3. Market Size and Market Growth ........................... 35 
3.3.4. Impact of EU.............................................................. 37 
                        3.4. Conclusion ............................................................................... 41 
CHAPTER IV: FDI IN PERSPECTIVE: PUSH AND PULL FACTORS .........  44 
4.1. Romania ...................................................................................  49 
4.2. Argentina .................................................................................. 52 
 ix 
4.3. Compare and Contrast ........................................................... 58 
 CHAPTER V: CONCLUSION ............................................................................. 61  
 SELECT BIBLIOGRAPHY ................................................................................... 65 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER I 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
In this thesis I will discuss foreign direct investments in Turkey with an 
emphasis on post-1999 environment. The main reason of this focus is the 
assumption that 1999 was an important turning point for economic and 
political restructuring in Turkey since it was given the candidate for 
European Union membership status at Helsinki Summit at this year. By 
focusing on this period I will emphasize domestic transformations as well as 
changing international structure with respect to the impact of European 
Union. 
Turkey till recently has been seen as an underperformer in terms of FDI 
inflow.  Since Turkey is relatively a large market offering low costs in terms 
of labor and situated close to the Western markets, the country should have 
definitely become an attractive address for FDI. However, political and 
economic instability, taxation, lack of infrastructure and some structural 
barriers proved to be important impediments.  These impediments on the 
other hand seem to be disappearing due to the influence of the EU and 
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structural changes undertaken to fulfill Copenhagen criteria.  Therefore, the 
influence of the EU and relative position of Turkey in the international FDI 
market deserves more attention. 
 
Consequently, in the first chapter I will set the theoretical framework to 
discuss the position of Turkey in FDI inflows, and while doing so, I believe 
the historical background will prove to draw a more comprehensive picture.  
 
Chapter two is reserved for a more detailed discussion of push and pull 
factors in relation to post-1999 environment. I will combine political and 
economic factors since they are closely related when it comes to legal 
framework and stability issues concerning foreign direct investment. 
 
In chapter three, I will try to put the discussions in chapter two into a 
critical perspective. To be able to see these factors I mentioned in the first and 
second chapters at work more clearly I will also provide two case studies for 
comparison: Argentina and Romania.  These two cases will be helpful to 
designate the role of EU and respective internal dynamics as well as to make 
some predictive statements for the near future. 
 
Finally, in the conclusion section, I will interpret my arguments 
presented in three of the chapters in light of the data I will be presenting. 
 
 
3 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER II 
 
FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT IN TURKEY: 
A HISTORICAL FRAMEWORK 
 
 
Foreign Direct Investment (hereafter FDI) is conventionally defined as 
”form of international inter-firm cooperation that involves a significant 
equity stake in, or effective management control of, foreign enterprises.”(De 
Mello 1997:4) There is a huge body of literature concerning FDI.  A 
considerable part of this literature focuses on FDI in third world economies, 
studies on decision-making processes of Multinational Corporations (MNCs) 
and more generally the push-and-pull factors of hosting economies.  Since 
developing countries come to think of FDI as an important source for capital 
and know-how, studies on these factors have been highlighted not only in 
the scholarly circles but also by policy making circles.  These developments 
are of course influenced by successful examples as well as the advice given 
by the World Bank and International Monetary Fund to the developing 
economies. Nevertheless one has to note the fact that the largest percentage 
of FDI is within the infamous triad- North America, Western Europe and 
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Japan.(Actually China can be a prospective member of this triad since in 2004 
it was the second largest host for FDI after the USA)  When developing 
countries are taken into consideration FDI flow is clearly focused on few 
countries.  As has been noted by Shah Tarzi we have ten countries that take 
the “lion’s share.” (Tarzi 2005:500) China taking the lead, Mexico, Brazil, 
India, South Africa and a group of emerging Asian economies happen to be 
in this list. As explicitly seen in Figure 1, most of the FDI goes to the 
developed countries. 
 
Figure 1: Distribution of FDI According to Country Groups 
Source: UNCTAD, World Investment Report 2007 
 
Here in this scheme how to attract FDI is tied to the question of what 
kind of incentives can be created and what kind of policy choices should be 
made to influence FDI flows, in short what is the added value of a country to 
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prosper in this environment of fierce competition for investment. These 
choices are very much related to the factors that influence the decisions of the 
MNC of investment when they choose a certain location. Table 1 can be 
helpful in our discussions. 
We can broadly summarize the main determinants of FDI as 
differentials in factor endowments, cost structures, characteristics of the 
market and the recipient economy. (De Mello jr 2007:2) From these three 
general factors the last one seems to be the most important one for our 
discussion.  Even if one can argue that cost structures are also related to the 
characteristics of the market and the recipient economy to a certain extent, I 
will discuss while making a broader analysis of push and pull factors.  
However, while doing that I will not dwell much on the explanations that 
emphasize microeconomic explanations that focus on the decision making at 
the enterprise level to take individual FDI projects. 
As can be seen from the table 1, market size and the potential growth of 
the market seem to play the most important role.  Theoretically speaking, 
when these closely interrelated factors are in evaluation, they can be 
considered as promising for Turkey that is commonly accepted as a country 
with a big potential. However, in spite of the expectations, when the current 
figures of FDI in Turkey are considered, these sentences are generally 
followed by “Turkey has a great potential but…”  Therefore it seems crucial 
to make a detailed analysis of the other factors in order to perceive the reason 
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of Turkey’s failure in fulfilling the expectations.  After these two, comes low 
level of competition as a determining factor; low level of competition in a 
host country would be contributing positively to the decisions of the 
investors. Position of Turkey in most sectors does not allow such an 
advantage by being an open economy connected to the markets in Europe 
and Middle East compared to possible protective measures favoring a 
specific firm in a closed economy.  This is especially the case after mid 90s 
when Turkey joined Customs Union as part of EU negotiations. After these 
three factors mentioned above, we need to take into consideration political 
stability, labor quality and infrastructure as important dynamics that 
influence FDI decisions.  Here, it seems Turkey has a lot to discuss. 
 
Location Factors Relevance(a) Adequacy (b) 
Low Labor Costs 3.59 65.0 
Low transportation/Logistics costs 3.09 65.0 
Labor Quality 4.39 77.7 
Availability and Low Cost of Land 2.62 57.3 
Large Size of Host Market 7.13 90.3 
Potential Growth of Host Market 7.53 88.3 
Low Level of Competition in Host 
Markets         
5.57 86.4 
Good Infrastructure 4.21 71.8 
Availability of Industrial Networks 3.36 70.9 
Political Stability 4.93 78.6 
Tax Reduction Incentives 2.85 61.2 
International Trade Agreements 3.01 61.2 
 
Table 1—Measures of relevance and adequacy for location factors (After 
Ufuk Canöz&Muharrem Aydın:2004) 
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Notes: (a) average score given to factor (based on 10) 
            (b) percentage of firms that scored the factor as a determinant 
 
 
Canöz and Aydın in their research, list the foremost determinant factors 
that affect the decisions of the investor firms and measure the relevance and 
adequacy of these factors. Relevance column refers to the average score given 
out of 10 by the firms to each factor whereas the adequacy column stands for 
the percentage of the firms that evaluate the factor as a determinant. Table 1 
is indeed in line with Dunning’s OLI model which incorporates macro 
economic analysis of FDI flow. (Dunning:1981) OLI stands for ownership, 
location and internalization advantages. (Dunning:1981) This model analyses 
FDI from three different approaches as exemplified with their initials. FDI 
decisions according to this approach are related to ownership, location and 
internalization advantages. Here again size of the market and growth rates 
matter as the most important factors.  As I have mentioned before, here 
Turkey does not have a particular disadvantage even if it cannot compete 
with the advantageous position of fashionable FDI targets such as India or 
China. However what comes after is more crucial and more related to 
political and socio-economic dynamics of the hosting economy. 
Macroeconomic stability, micro and macro political stability with a well 
developed infrastructure are accounted for the following factors of 
importance while the case of Turkey proves the importance of the latter.  
Since Turkey is relatively a large market offering low costs in terms of labor 
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and situated close to the Western markets, she should have definitely become 
an important address for FDI if she did not fail in the factors I have just 
mentioned.  This being the case, in the following chapter, I will dwell on 
internal dynamics of post-1999 period in detail. Yet before going into the 
details of this discussion I would like to provide a general picture about FDI 
and Turkey’s record of FDI so far. 
 
2.1. Historical Background 
 
 
Figure 2: FDI permits and inflows by years until 2002 
 
Source: General Directorate of Foreign Investment (GDFI). February 
2003. Foreign Investment in Turkey 2002. Republic of Turkey Prime Ministry 
Undersecretariat of Treasury 
 
Although the legal framework preparations for the Foreign Direct 
Investment were already started in 1950s, after the end of statist economic 
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policies, the liberalization of the Turkish economy, namely its opening to the 
world has changed over time. The impact of Import Substitution 
Industrialization (ISI) policies, political instability, coup d’etats, intervention 
in Cyprus and most importantly non-liberal characteristic of the Turkish 
economy limited FDI flow severely up to 1980. In 1979, inflation reached 
triple-digit levels, unemployment rates rose considerably and the 
government had problems in payments of loans. This was seen as the 
ultimate failure of the ISI system which would eventually start to be replaced 
by neo-liberal measures. This period of political and economic instability and 
unwelcoming environment of FDI was reflected in numbers.  As has been 
noted by Melek Us, the director of foreign investment department in Turkey, 
the cumulative FDI until 1980 was only USD 220 million. (GDFI:2003) 
 
24 January 1980 decisions were crucial in changing the ongoing state of 
Turkish economy. It was a set of economic policy packages which changed 
the structure of Turkish economy. They were steps taken towards the 
liberalization of the economy and included decisions such as devaluation of 
currency and encouragement of foreign investment.  After the 
implementation of these decisions, the economy experienced a relatively 
high growth rate, a healthy balance of payments and relatively low inflation 
in early 1980s which unfortunately changed again in the late 1980s due to 
populist policies of the changing governments. Late 1980s and early 1990s 
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was marked by a failure of deflationary policies and debt financing which 
culminated in the crisis of 1994.   The share of FDI in GNP remained 
insignificant, rising only from 0.1 percent during the 1970s to 0.4 percent 
during the 1990s. (Central Bank of Turkey 2002:22)  
 
1980s was a period of export-led growth and opening of the economy 
but FDI only started to enter the economy significantly after 1988, remaining 
at a low level.  Between 1985 and 2001 total FDI  was 7.7 billion, “roughly 
equivalent to total long-term borrowing by the private sector (excluding 
banks) in just one year (1999)” (Ertugal & Selçuk 2001:10) This is clearly an 
outcome of the instability of the political and economic environment and a 
signal for structural adjustments.  One has to remind the political instability 
and the inflationary environment of the time not to mention that Turkey 
experienced three major financial crises within this period.  Even if Turkey 
has experienced such problems, fortunately she succeeded in getting back on 
the track both in political and economic terms. In this process a prospective 
EU membership served as the most accelerating issue on the agenda which 
was set as a target for policy makers. 
 
As I have mentioned above, prospective EU membership has been a big 
factor for attracting FDI since it can be interpreted as a sign of new 
opportunities and more importantly as a sign of prospective stability.  Yet 
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one of the important landmarks in terms of Turkish integration to the EU, 
Customs Union does not seem to have a major impact. Table 3 shows that 
1995 and 1996 witnessed an upward trend in terms of FDI permissions but 
they were failed to be realized in the long term.  That is why one may 
conclude that it does not have an impact for FDI inflow to Turkey.  However, 
it also shows that beginning of such a relationship with the EU definitely 
attracted attention if not created a period of rapid FDI inflow. Just like 
indirect impact of FDI for the development of a given economy (contributing 
to the structure of the economy) (Alfaro: 2004), EU seems to have an indirect 
impact through attracting attention to Turkey. The fact that this attention 
could not be sustained is of course related to internal and external dynamics 
that I have mentioned above and will elaborate in the next chapter. 
  
Even if Turkish economy was proceeding in liberalization and there 
were important steps taken for EU membership in the period between 1980 
and 2007 there were three major economic crises that proved to be serious 
impediments for FDI inflow. The crisis of 1994, 1999 and 2000/2001 can be 
seen as crises of economic structure, mismanagement and cumulative results 
of populist policies. (Öniş: 2003) The normalization efforts then after were 
held in cooperation with IMF. New stand-by agreements were signed which 
coupled with determinant steps taken to join European Union. There have 
been positive signs with structural changes in the economy and a relative 
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political stability.  By 2004, Turkey was catching up with prospective 
members of the EU such as Romania which were to be accepted within the 
Union by 2007.  Considering this fact, such a comparison would be very 
productive for analyzing effects of EU in FDI flows.  Therefore I will discuss 
it in the third chapter while focusing on the external factors.  
 
So far, I have mainly emphasized economic stability, yet politics and 
economy cannot be separated that easily.  Economic instability goes hand in 
hand with political instability and vice versa.  When a country such as 
Turkey embarks upon liberalization of its economy it would necessitate 
structural and institutional changes which need a long-term stable policy 
making.  The mere fact of the existence of 13 different governments between 
1989 and 2003 is itself very suggestive of the situation.  Important issues such 
as privatization (which was on the agenda since the 1980s but continues to 
remain unfinished as of today) and revision of the banking system received 
fluctuating attention from different governments and plans of structural 
change remained less effective due to the instability of the political 
environment. 
 
2.2. Contemporary Environment and Obstacles for FDI 
Last five years from this perspective can be considered as a significant 
change.  AKP government managed to provide a relatively stable political 
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environment owing to the fact of being a single party government instead of 
a coalition as we were used to have. Non negligible steps were taken by this 
government to fulfill Copenhagen criteria, so that membership talks have 
been opened in 2005. This functions as a guarantee for continued 
democratization while measures were started to be taken against corruption 
and the independence of the judiciary system.  These developments seem to 
be very promising when presented as such but they need further discussion 
as important internal dynamics which have enormous influence on FDI flow 
to Turkey as can be seen  in Table 3. Yet again maybe one of the most 
important developments concerning FDI was the new law to encourage FDI.  
In the words of US-Turkish Business Council (TAIK) it was part of a law that 
aims to “eliminate bureaucratic red tape, introduce equal treatment to both 
domestic and foreign investors and protect foreign investors’ rights in a fashion 
that match international standards” (TAIK 2004)  The law brings about changes 
that would make it easier to pass necessary bureaucratic steps for investment, 
that would lead to equal treatment of Turkish citizens and foreigners together 
with an internationally accepted definition of “foreign investor”.  As has been 
announced by TAIK, they were clearly motivated to be more competitive in the 
international market to attract FDI. 
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Figure 3: Major obstacles of FDI in Turkey 
 
Source: OECD, Economic Survey: Turkey (October 2004), p.143. 
(cited in Hadjit and Browne, p.329) 
 
 
Yet again when we take another look at the table 3 above, the obstacles as 
of 2004 seems to be less bureaucratic than political since infrastructure and 
taxation are well down the least while political instability is the biggest 
obstacle.  This being the case, the impact of being an EU candidate becomes 
more important especially because it is an anchor for political stability and 
structural reforms.  Therefore, I will be taking Argentina and Romania as two 
cases studies that are comparable with Turkish FDI story. They will help me 
determine the role and influence of EU in this particular situation and also help 
us understand the specific combination of external and internal dynamics that 
were impediments for FDI so far but can be overcome or  become a source of 
potential in the coming decades. I choose Argentina as a success story which can 
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be compared to Turkey both due to its structural/historical background and 
market size. Here EU would not be playing a role so the emphasis would be in 
different dynamics.  However, Romania being a Central Eastern European 
(CEE) transition economy proves to be an interesting example for Turkey not 
only for the analysis of EU influence on candidate countries but also due to its 
timing of EU membership. 
 
Hadjit and Browne suggest in reference to Bevan and Estrin that “countries 
that take part in the EU accession process benefit from increased FDI while the 
relative position of the delayed entrants could weaken and therefore EU 
announcements tend to widen divisions in terms of FDI among delayed entrants 
and candidate countries.”(Hadjit and Moxon-Browne 2005:326) This idea is 
essential since it brings an analyze to the situation of post-1999 environment 
(which will be the focus of this thesis) 
 
Since EU negotiations play the role of the carrot and the stick 
simultaneously, this not only provides a motivation to fulfill Copenhagen 
criteria immediately but also ensures relative political and economic stability 
in fear of causing another economic crisis if the path of reforms is left aside. 
This aspect seems to be crucial in the development of all candidate countries 
but since Turkey’s situation proves to be more complicated than others it will 
become the major focus of my comparison between Turkey and Romania. 
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All in all, the importance of FDI in economic development is recognized 
world wide not only by individual counties but also by international 
organizations such as the World Bank or IMF when their emphasis on FDI as 
a structural tool to increase the strength of an economy is considered. The 
share of FDI that goes outside the triad of Europe, North America and Japan 
is relatively small.  Yet this share is also not distributed evenly but focuses on 
ten major developing economies which can be listed as China, Brazil, Mexico, 
Argentina, Poland, Chile, Malaysia, Korea, Thailand, and Venezuela. Under 
these conditions states have to be very competitive if they want to attract 
FDI.  When reliance on debts and what can be called as short-term capital 
flows were realized to be unsatisfactory and dangerous by many crises, there 
has been a growing motivation to invite FDI.  Here the crucial question came 
to be “how to realize the potential Turkey has.” As I have noted above 
Turkey has an advantage in terms of providing a large market, lower cost of 
labor and proximity to Western markets in general even if these advantages 
vary according to different types of FDI and specifics of every individual 
sector. However, political and economic instability, taxation, lack of 
infrastructure and some structural barriers proved to important impediments 
in the Turkish experience.  These impediments on the other hand seem to be 
improving due to the influence of EU and structural changes undertaken to 
fulfill Copenhagen criteria; that is why the influence of EU and relative 
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position of Turkey in the international FDI market deserves more attention. 
To be able to make a deeper analysis I will be discussing the issues I 
mentioned above under two clusters.  These clusters can be titled as external 
and internal dynamics.  While doing that I am fully aware of the fact that 
these two cannot be separated from each other since they are very much 
intertwined and react against changes within each other.  To be able to see 
these factors at work more clearly I will also provide two case studies for 
comparison: Argentina and Romania.  I hope that these two cases will be 
helpful to designate the role of EU and respective internal dynamics as well 
as to contextualize my arguments in this chapter. 
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CHAPTER III 
 
FDI IN TURKEY: POST-1999 ENVIRONMENT 
 
 
The year 1999 is a milestone in Turkey’s journey through the reform 
processes both in politics and economics brought by the EU conditionality. 
This is the year that Turkey gained the formal candidate status at Helsinki 
Summit.(Öniş: 2004) That is why the Turkish case is analyzed in this thesis 
with a special focus on 1999, with the developments before and after this 
year. As mentioned before, the comparative cases of Turkey, Romania and 
Argentina that will be explored in the following chapters are chosen to point 
out that an external anchor (political or economical) functions as an assistant 
to the host country to prosper in the highly challenging competition of FDI 
attraction. Considering this fact, once again shall be underlined that EU, not 
directly, but indirectly by pushing Turkey to conform the Copenhagen 
criteria contributed a lot to the credibility of Turkey which was proved by the 
significant process in political space in such a short period of time.  
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I would like to open discussions about Turkey by stating certain facts 
as has been presented in the country brief of the World Bank in 2002. (World 
Bank 2002) The opening statement starts to define Turkey as a dynamic 
emerging market economy. After briefly mentioning the demographic data 
and the developments in the EU membership process, it closes the opening 
phrase by noting that “Although Turkey is the world’s 17th most 
industrialized nation, it ranks 85th out of 173 countries in terms of Human 
Development Indicators, as measured by the UNDP in 2002.”  These kinds of 
statements “although Turkey has a positive X, it fails to do Y” has been quite 
common regarding the political economic situation of Turkey. As I have 
discussed in the introduction one such typical example was “Turkey has a 
big potential for attracting FDI due to various reasons but it fails to realize 
this potential” The aim of this chapter would be to explore the hows and 
whys of such a statement. 
 
It has been well known that developed countries are the main receivers 
of FDI inflows if we follow the example of the infamous triad I have 
mentioned in the introduction. They have suitable determinants for 
attracting FDI.  Therefore, it would not be wrong to assume that the amount 
of FDI a country receives is also related to the level of development as well as 
the strength of the economy and specific advantages that can be discussed 
through Dunning’s model.    
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3.1. Changing World and FDI 
John H. Dunning, being one of the most influential theoreticians of FDI, 
evaluates the period of the last two decades as a significantly changing 
environment of FDI. (Dunning 2002a: 222-38)  Of course this change is very 
much related to the change in world economic relations and globalization the 
effects of which were started to be felt in the beginning of the 1980s. In a 
nutshell we can point to these changes with respect to the position of FDI 
and country positions in seven categories in Dunning’s words (Dunning 
2002: 224); 
- Renaissance of the market system 
- Globalization of the economic activity 
- Enhanced mobility of wealth-creating assets 
- Increasing number of countries approaching ‘take-off’ stage in 
development. 
- Convergence of economic structures among advanced countries, and 
some industrializing countries 
- Changing criteria by which governments evaluate FDI 
- Better appreciation by governments of the costs and benefits of FDI. 
 
As can be seen from the categories mentioned above FDI in our 
world is usually related to competitiveness. FDI can be seen as positive for 
long-terms foreign capital flows but one has to be hesitant to make 
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generalizations that FDI is something positive for the economy. The point 
that has to be taken into account is FDI’s “contribution to the improvement 
of the competitiveness of the resources and asset-creating capabilities located 
within their areas of jurisdiction.” (Dunning 2002: 228) This being the case 
productivity and comparative advantage would be the two most important 
aspects that we should emphasize. 
 
Consequently there is a need of fine tuning to be aware of different 
types of FDI. Broadly speaking we can distinguish two tendencies within FDI 
one being initial and the other being sequential.  Initial FDI was based on 
resource seeking or market seeking which was dominant type of foreign 
direct investment till 1980s. (Dunning 2002:233) However the most dominant 
type of FDI came to be efficiency seeking and strategic asset seeking in the 
1990s which changed the advantages of hosting FDI significantly. If we again 
follow Dunning’s argument we can categorize and distinguish these types as 
follows (Dunning 2002a:233): 
 
1-Resource seeking: 
(Physical/human resources)                                       mainly motives for 
2-Market seeking:                                                                 initial FDI 
(Domestic/regional markets) 
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3-Efficiency seeking: rationalization of production  
to exploit economies of specialization and scope                mainly  
(product/process specialization)                                            motives for 
4- Strategic (created) asset seeking:                                  sequential FDI 
(technology/ organization/ market) 
 
The main reason that I have mentioned above categories is that what 
FDI seeks is directly related to what it gives to the host country’s economy.   
In the cases of market or resource seeking type of FDI the structural benefits 
for the host economy would be secondary since they would at first hand 
contribute to domestic competition, rising product quality, access to foreign 
markets and fostering of backward supply linkages. On the other hand third 
and fourth type of FDI would affect international division of labor, structural 
adjustment, cross-border networking, new finance capital and strategic assets 
which are far more crucial for economic structure of the hosting countries. 
This latter cluster of types exists as the phenomena of mostly 1990s and that 
vary depending on the differences in sectors. Turkey also witnessed these 
types of FDI especially in automotive and textile industries.  However, due to 
the problems I will discuss below this type of FDI remained below the 
potential. 
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3.2. Profile of Turkey: An Under-Performer 
If we turn from theoretical discussions to our case study, it can be 
argued that 1999 stands as a breaking point in Turkey’s political and also 
economic journey. It is the year when Turkey launched an extensive 
economic reform program to overcome chronic high inflation and restore 
sustained growth.  It is also the year when Turkey became a candidate for EU 
membership at the Helsinki Summit in December.  However, before 
proceeding with the discussion of post-1999, it would be better to mention 
some of the characteristics of pre-1999 environment.  
 
The decade of 1970s was marked by Import Substitution 
Industrialization with an emphasis on statism. This environment was very 
hostile for FDI inflows and thus between the year 1970 and 1980 the total 
amount of FDI was about 90 million USD. (General directorate of Foreign 
Investment: 2002) 1980s brought change in economic policies which can be 
summarized as a shift from protectionist statist policies towards export 
orientation and economic liberalization. This shift resulted in an increase in 
FDI inflows for Turkey but the picture remained more or less stagnant 
during the 1990s. This stagnation became the starting point of asking why 
Turkey can not realize her potential.  I would also like to draw attention to 
the discrepancy between the permitted FDI and actual FDI at this point. 
There are significant differences in different years which is quite telling yet 
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alerting. This discrepancy shows a willingness on the part of the investors 
which could not be realized. If we consider that generally permissions are 
twice as much as the actual FDI, this discrepancy once again forces us to 
question the unfulfilled potential. As I have shown in table 2 above, there are 
fluctuations in FDI inflows mostly due to economic and political crisis. 
 International Finance Corporation (IFC) is one of the bodies that work 
in cooperation with the World Bank.  Regarding Turkey, one of the goals of 
IFC , as stated in their website is to “As the government’s privatization 
program picks up steam, IFC will put additional emphasis on the broader 
infrastructure sector, including electricity, ports, and logistics, and on 
supporting flagship privatizations, attracting foreign interest, and 
stimulating the flow of foreign direct investment.” (IFC 2008)As I have 
mentioned before FDI is seen crucial for the restructuring of Turkish 
economy which is considered almost as a rule for most of the developing 
countries.  Therefore, deficiencies in the area of FDI are indicative of the 
problems of Turkish economy in general and worth closer study. 
 
Asım Erdilek (Erdilek: 2003) makes a summary of the existing literature 
with the question of “why Turkey lagged behind in attracting FDI compared 
to other developing countries?” Here again we see two different types of 
problems: Economic and non-economic problems. The author provides a 
long list of mostly structural problems. 
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 “Economic causes include high transactions costs of entry and 
operation for foreign investors (due to excessive bureaucracy and 
red tape, and widespread corruption), chronic high inflation, 
increasing economic instability, inward orientation until 1980, lack 
of protection of intellectual property rights, lack of inflation 
accounting and internationally acceptable accounting standards, 
failure of privatization, insufficient legal structure and inadequate 
infrastructure (especially energy). Non-economic causes include 
chronic political instability, internal conflicts (especially the Kurdish 
problem), historical animosity towards foreign economic presence 
(dating back to the Capitulations during the Ottoman Empire), fear 
of foreign political domination within the civilian and the military 
bureaucracy, lack of FDI promotion (indicating an unwillingness or 
reluctance to attract FDI), and the structure of Turkish business 
(family-owned and controlled and closed to foreign takeovers).” 
(Erdilek 2003:2) 
 
 
Economic causes are more or less similar to what exists in the literature, 
however, in the non-economic part there are not only structural political 
problems but also characteristics of Turkish political culture is also 
mentioned. We can see this in two of the factors mentioned above, namely, 
historical animosity towards foreign economic presence and fear of political 
domination within the civilian and military bureaucracy.  I believe these 
claims deserve attention in explaining the impediments against reforms 
which would prepare a hospitable environment for FDI.  In stating these 
problems and the following comparison of inflow and outflow of FDI in 
Turkey, Erdilek uses John H. Dunning's eclectic ownership-location-
internalization (OLI) paradigm and its dynamic version, the Investment 
Development Path model which I have mentioned earlier. Based on this 
paradigm and looking at the statistics, the author concludes that by the year 
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2003, relationship with the EU and participation to the Customs Union did 
not have a significant effect on FDI inflows mainly due to the reasons I have 
listed above. Consequently, here again, the idea is that the EU would be a 
major source of dynamism to ensure political and economic stability 
increasing the potential of Turkey for receiving FDI but this potential is not 
realized due to domestic facts and bureaucratic impediments. 
 
An interesting indicator of Turkey’s poor performance is UNCTAD’s 
categorization. UNCTAD divides countries according to their FDI 
Performance and Potential Indices. There are four groups, namely; front 
runners, above potential economies, below potential economies and under-
performers. As has been pointed out by Erdilek Turkey is listed among the 
under-performers, which are generally poor countries, for both the 1988-1990 
and the 1998-2000 periods.  This is all the more interesting if Turkey’s FDI 
outflow is compared with its performance in inflow.  Even if Turkey is far 
behind from her potential as a host country, her place is improving as an 
investor starting with 1994. (Erdilek 2003). 
 
A related factor for this stagnation is of course the case of privatization. 
By the year 2002, the share of privatization related FDI in Turkey is just 30% 
of the total FDI. This figure is rather low especially when we compare it with 
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the figures of the transition economies of Central and Eastern Europe.(Begün 
2003) 
 
Here at this point, some statistical data would be very helpful to analyse 
the current situation in Turkey. The FDI reports that are prepared by the 
General Directorate of Foreign Direct Investment assist to a great extent in 
this means. According to Table 2 below, we see a sharp increase in FDI in 
2005, almost five times of the FDI attracted in 2004. However again in 2008, 
we observe a decrease for the first 5 months compared to the same months of 
the last year. It can be argued that this may be related to the political 
ambiguity in Turkey under the AKP government. 
 
 
Table 2: International Direct Investment in TR (Inflows) 
Source: General Directorate of Foreign Investment (GDFI). July 2008. 
International Direct Investment Bulletin 
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The relative position of Turkey compared to the other FDI attracting 
countries shall also be underlined while analyzing the numbers in Turkey to 
get a better comprehension. According to the World Investment Report of 
2007, Turkey ranks 5th among the developing countries while being 16th 
worldwide whereas China taking the lead of the developing countries as 
usual by being 5th worldwide.  
 
Figure 4: Top ten FDI recipient countries and Turkey 
Source: UNCTAD, World Investment Report 2007 
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3.3. Structural Changes 
June 2003 is a breaking point in the history of FDI in Turkey. On 17 June 
2003, a new law, “Foreign Direct Investment Law”, was passed abolishing 
the necessity to have permission from the state to make FDI and turned into 
a system of disclosure. This brought a sharp increase in FDI inflow. Till 2003, 
to establish a firm, a foreign investor had to get permission from the General 
Directorate of Foreign Investment (GDFI) which operates in the 
Undersecretariat of Treasury. After the permission the investor had to go 
through another series of bureaucratic procedures. After this level is passed 
succesfully the investor had to face another layer of problems to own real 
estates which becomes even more troublesome if it is related to public-
owned lands. (Begün 2003: 20) 
 
I have to remind that this law was also backed by new incentives issued 
for the coming foreign investment which accelerated FDI inflows. Formation 
of the Improvement of the Investment Environment Coordination Board 
(IIECB) was also a crucial step since it proved that the Turkish government is 
very determined about attracting FDI. 
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 1954-1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 Oct Total 
New 3.928 356 351 371 899 1.608 1.887 9.400 
Total 4.580 492 504 517 1.141 2.150 2.323 11.707 
 
Table 3. Foreign Investment Firms by the year 2005 
Source: Hazine Müsteşarlığı, Doğrudan Yabancı Yatırım Raporu,2005 
 
When we look at the “Foreign Investment Report 2005” issued by the 
Undersecretariat of Treasury we see that more than half of FDI originates 
from EU countries(top three being Germany, Holland and UK) which stands 
as an interesting drawing point of our discussion of impact of EU on FDI in 
the case of Turkey. More importantly, in the years of 2004 and 2005 more 
than 80% of capital investment originates from EU countries.(Hazine 
müsteşarlığı 2005:3)  If we remember the political climate it was only on 16 
December 2004 that the EU leaders decided to start accession negotiations 
with Turkey which was to start from 3 October 2005. Even if there was some 
tension and ambiguity as to the prospect of membership, liberalization of 
laws and incentives seem to be coupled with a prospective membership.  
 
2004 also marks formation of an interesting body, Investment 
Consultation Council. In the report it is stated that formation of such a body 
“aims to provide an international perspective to decrease the impediments in 
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front of investment and to improve the image of Turkey as a country 
profitable for investment in the international arena and finally to improve the 
conditions of investment by the government.  To this end, this body is 
created in the form of a platform composed of managers of leading 
multinational corporations (MNCs).” (Hazine Müsteşarlığı 2005) In the first 
meeting in 2004 the council advised the government to abolish the hampers 
created by the bureaucracy, enlarge the incentives to provide an investment 
area to draw attention of the foreign firms and businessmen, to strengthen 
Small and Medium Size Enterprises (SME), to improve educational and 
infrastructural conditions as well as judicial facilities. These points seem to 
have provided a road map for the government when the reforms following 
2004 are considered.  Interestingly, this council seems to have gained a wide 
recognition by important actors of FDI. In the second meeting in 2005 we see 
participation of 19 top ranking managers from MNCs, presidents of World 
Bank,IMF, European Bank of Investment together with representatives from 
Turkish private sector. In this meeting social security and institutional 
governmentality was added to the agenda of improvement for increasing 
FDI inflows. (Hazine Müsteşarlığı, 2005) The council held meetings in 2006 
and 2007 as well. In the reports announced afterwards, there were very 
positive comments about the achievements of the government and advice to 
increase the incentives for FDI and improve infrastructure. 
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3.3.1. Stability 
This variable is easy to generalize but one has to be careful before going 
into deeper analysis. The first point that has to be clarifies is to determine 
what kind of stability we are talking about.  Stability is seen as an important 
factor in almost all models explaining FDI; however, there is a tendency to 
distinguish political and economic stability. If we recall table 1 I discussed in 
the introduction, both of these were seen as fundamental indicators, yet we 
need a fine-tuning here. What is meant from political stability may not 
necessarily mean long-term strong governments in power.  Rather than that 
we have to take a look at the macro level analysis.  In the case of economy it 
would be macro economic indicators and vulnerability of a specific country 
to possible economic crises that can be caused by negative domestic 
dynamics or by fluctuations in the global market. In the political realm, it 
would mean long term consistency of policies and structural stability of the 
regimes and lack of fundamental societal conflicts.  This can be seen in the 
comparative analysis of Mustafa Begün.  When Poland and Turkey are 
compared both of the countries seem to have suffered of political instability 
in terms of constant government changes in the 1990s but these political 
circumstances do not seem to have a negative effect on Poland as a major FDI 
hosting country in the Central and Eastern Europe.(Begün 2003: 74) 
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However, maybe a third aspect of stability should be added here to 
explain FDI behavior which would be related to stability in the legal 
framework.  Legal framework in Turkey has been improving to be more 
satisfying for conditions of FDI, nevertheless, when it comes to 
implementation the picture becomes ambiguous. Foreign Investment 
Advisory Service report presents serious concerns at this point. In this report, 
a vital signal is mentioned about the inconsistency in the implementation of 
law, time-consuming procedures and decision-making processes and the 
following uncertainty caused by this inconsistency. (Erdilek 2003)  Of course, 
this is partly related to political instability but it has more immediate effects 
on FDI decisions. This problem was targeted by many advisory bodies and 
serious steps were taken to overcome this instability. Here, prospective EU 
membership was one of the most important tools as an external anchor. Once 
legal framework has been revised according to create better incentives for 
FDI and reach the standards of EU, they are expected to remain consistent. 
 
3.3.2. Privatization 
Privatization is seen crucial for the liberalization of economies. 
Although starting from the 1980s Turkey took a path towards privatization, 
the progress is proved to be slow. There can be many reasons behind this 
slow pace but we should not undermine the lack of political incentive that is 
at stake. There were political concerns against fast privatization due to the 
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negative image in the public which associates privatization with the 
capitulations of the Ottoman times. This point of view may seem absurd at 
first glance but it is very common to find criticisms of privatization in 
reference to foreign powers taking control of Turkish economy.  As has been 
noted by Asım Erdilek, existence of such a discourse stands as a political risk 
for governments. This discourse is sometimes coupled with “selling country 
to outsiders” or betrayal of Atatürk’s principles such as statism. 
Consequently, it is not surprising to observe that rapid privatization took 
place in the immediate aftermath of economic crisis so that it becomes easier 
to justify not mentioning the guidance from the World Bank and the IMF.  
After the 2001 crisis the picture started to change considerably with 
acceleration in privatization. The upwards trend Turkey experienced in 
receiving FDI in the last five years is also related to this wave of 
privatization.  Firstly, it was an indicator of commitment to liberalization.  
Secondly and more importantly as can be seen in the FDI figures of 2004 and 
2005 considerable amount of FDI Turkey attracted in these years is created 
by privatization. 
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Figure 5: Privatization Figures for Turkey (in USD million) 
 
Source: Turkish Privatization Administration 
Previously, there were series of bureaucratic and legal barriers against 
privatization which led investors to think that Turkey does not favor FDI and 
there is a continuous mistrust against foreigners which are naturally very 
discouraging for investors. (Lowendahl and Ertugal 30) This obstacle of legal 
instability can be said to overcome with the structural reforms as a result of 
stand-by agreements and reforms to fulfill EU criteria.  One of the most 
successful reforms that directly affected FDI in terms of legal stability would 
be the “Foreign Direct Investment Law” of 2003. 
 
3.3.3. Market Size and Market Growth 
So far I have mentioned different factors which are not necessarily 
strictly economic. However, market size being obviously an essential 
economic indicator, plays a big role in forming the basis of the potential of 
Turkey as a major FDI target. Different scholars, such as Erden, Erdal and 
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Tatoloğlu (1996) argue that this is the biggest asset of Turkey in attracting 
FDI. Turkey has a big potential for providing cheap labour as well as 
strategic location which is coupled with the advantage of the market size. 
This list of advantages stands as non negligible pull factors which also affect 
the choices of FDI about the sectors.  
 
When the breakdown of FDI in sectors is analyzed through years it 
seems that service sector is growing at a regular pace which is an indicative 
of Turkey’s advantage in providing labour to foreign firms. I have to note 
that new FDI operations have changed the structural composition of overall 
FDI activity in Turkey, in favor of service industries such as tourism, 
banking, trade and other business and financial services. (Demirbag et.al. 
2007) 
 
Yet this also indicates a growing need for a qualified labor which 
necessitates proper education for Turkey’s growing youth population.  When 
the reports of the World Bank and International Finance Corporation are 
considered Turkey has already started to receive signals to put more 
emphasis on education. However, the indicators so far do not seem to be 
satisfactory and advisory bodies continue to underline the importance of an 
educated labour force to attract further FDI. 
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Sectors Number of firms as of the year 
2005 
Agriculture 154 
Mining 197 
Manufacturing 2.539 
Construction 658 
Commerce 4.293 
Hotels and restaurants 926 
Telecommunications 994 
Real estate 1.156 
Others 790 
Total 11.707 
 
Table 4 -FDI by sectors 
Source: Foreign Direct Investment Report, Undersecretariat of 
Treasury,2005 
 
3.3.4. Impact of EU 
I will actually analyze the impact of EU in the next chapter through 
comparisons with Argentina and Romania but it needs to be at least briefly 
mentioned here as it is claimed to be a catalyst as an external anchor for FDI 
inflow for Turkey. 
 
John H. Dunning analyses the impact of Internal Market Program (IMP) 
regarding the European Community. This was quite an earlier measure to 
enhance FDI within Europe but what has come out of it is very enlightening 
to comprehend the impact of European Union.(Dunning 2002b) IMP was a 
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quite good working catalysis for enhancing intra-EC FDI flows.  Its main 
contribution seems to be on market size, income levels and the structure of 
economic activity which were crucial for the economies of Spain and 
Portugal.  This being the case we can safely conclude that it helped to lay a 
solid basis for European Union and its FDI flows. 
 
Lowendahl and Ertugal argue that European countries have a tendency 
to channel FDI within the borders of EU.  Consequently EU membership 
becomes an advantage for attracting FDI from EU countries.  It can be argued 
that in the current picture, the relationship with the EU has already started to 
show its effects on FDI since EU countries are the biggest investors with 
increasing shares (Table 5). It is also related to the entering the triad of FDI I 
mentioned in the introduction. Examples of Central and East European 
countries are very promising in that sense. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
39 
Countries Number of Firms 
EU members (25) 6.076 
Germany  2.013 
Holland  922 
Britain  907 
France  458 
Italy  421 
USA  605 
Total 11.707 
 
Table 5 - Number of foreign firms by the year 2005 compared in terms 
of country of origin 
Source: Foreign Direct Investment Report, Undersecretariat of Treasury, 
2005. 
 
Secondly, EU membership has been considered as a central political and 
economic anchor. (I will discuss the status of anchor in my comparison of 
Romania and Turkey)  It is sufficient to say that reforms undertaken to fulfill 
the Copenhagen criteria and to start negotiations of membership made a 
considerable positive effect on political stability and the liberalization of the 
economy. The restructuring of the Turkish economy according to the neo-
liberal principles are in fact making progress under the influence of two 
important actors: IMF and EU.(Öniş and Bakır: 2007) While IMF provides 
important guidance in terms of the economic structures, EU provides a 
double influence, both political and economic. Since my argument in this 
thesis is the predominance of the political factors over the economic ones in 
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attracting FDI when certain structural prerequisites such as free markets is 
realized, then EU carries a heavy weight to evaluate FDI flows to Turkey.  
 
Turkey has started negotiation talks, which is a good sign for attracting 
more FDI from the EU network. However, Turkey is a bit disadvantageous 
by being a latecomer to the European Union because there are already 
countries from Central and Eastern Europe that have become members of the 
EU and in the case of a slow-down in the accession process of Turkey the 
advantages I have mentioned above have a potential to turn into 
disadvantages. This uncertainty on the other hand can be a restraint for 
potential investors. Therefore, it is exactly the point where politics and 
economy are intertwined to the extent that becomes impossible to 
distinguish. 
 
One case in point is the position of Central European countries and their 
relationship with the EU. Nina Bandelj argues that EU integration may not 
have affected countries in this region equally not only due to specific 
economic characteristics of countries but also due to the difference of 
political relationships with the previous members of the EU.(Bandelj 2002)  
This argument clearly highlights the political aspects of the equilibrium and 
hints that the tricky role of politics is not limited to the legal framework and 
stability issues when it comes to FDI. I will discuss this argument further in 
 
 
41 
the next chapter but I would like to make a few notes before closing this one. 
If what Bandelj argues is the case, then we can safely claim that EU should 
have a far more significant impact on the developments of FDI inflow in 
Turkey than can be measured or observed directly. Moreover, depending on 
the nature of accession talks, EU can have even a bigger impact be it positive 
or negative. 
 
 
3.4. Conclusion 
 
Murat Karaege argues that Turkey had failed to provide two main 
determinants of FDI:  policy framework (i.e. performance of the economy, 
political stability,privatization strategy, tax policy) and business facilitation 
(i.e. administrative procedures, corruption). (Karaege 2006:41) There seems 
to be considerable improvement in both of the determinants with the 
introduction of new reforms and the “foreign investment law”.  These 
incentives made the administrative procedures easier for investment.  
Moreover, the road taken with stabilization program of IMF seems to be 
going smoothly so far together with growth and inflation control (though 
there are some fluctuations recently) In this process reforms undertaken to 
fulfill EU integration process also affected both economic and political 
environment, increasing the credibility of Turkey as an FDI hosting country.  
All these developments reflected themselves in the statistics. 
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However, this does not mean that Turkey no longer has any problems 
concerning foreign direct investment.  Stability remains to be a crucial issue 
on the agenda due to the history of chronic economic and political crises.  
Even if laws were passed to change the legal framework to make it easier to 
invest, some barriers still remain. One of the existing barriers is the haunting 
ghost of capitulations.  In the media, when foreign direct investment was 
discussed, we still see hesitations of a possible foreign domination of 
economy.  At times when political issues started to be tense between the 
government and the opposition, this fear is more prone to occur. In line with 
what Asım Erdilek notes (Erdilek 2003), suspicion towards FDI continues in 
the bureaucracy and the legal circles as can be seen in the discussions of 
privatization. 
 
What is even more interesting is the fact that there is still an unknown 
deck of cards on the table and that is the future of EU integration.  
Membership talks have started and they proceed in a fluctuating pace. Due 
to political uncertainty on the part of the EU members about Turkish 
membership, the situation continues to be ambiguous.  This ambiguity is of 
course coupled with domestic signals of political and economic problems.   
Yet this ambiguity and slow pace of developments puts Turkey into a 
disadvantageous situation.  New members are already far ahead of securing 
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their places in the European Union network of investments and ambiguity 
unfortunately contributes to Turkey’s position of dwelling more on the level 
of potential and less on the level of realization. 
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CHAPTER IV 
 
FDI IN PERSPECTIVE 
PUSH AND PULL FACTORS 
 
 
Central Europe and Latin America as regions provide us different 
aspects of liberalization and FDI attraction.  In the literature Central and 
South Eastern Europe is discussed within the framework of transforming 
into market economies and integration to European Union. Latin America on 
the other hand is generally referred within the framework of political 
economic transformations (liberalization and democratization), crisis and 
advantage of proximity to the USA.  Of course none of these regions are 
highlighted as much as East Asia as the source of miracles and recovery.  In 
this section I will emphasize some aspects of FDI environment of two 
countries from these two regions.  My examples will be focused on Romania 
and Argentina.  I hope that their experience in terms of FDI attraction can 
provide a solid ground for comparison with Turkey which I explain below.  
In doing so, I hope that this section will be helping more to enlighten about 
Turkish experience in perspective. 
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Latin America has an interesting story of foreign direct investment.  
Although the historical background shows that Latin American countries 
were early comers in this area, the literature refers 1980s as the “lost decade” 
for Latin America.  The main reason of failure was the high inflationary 
environments and failure in liberalization attempts in the economy which 
were coupled with constant political crises. Since then privatization came to 
be one of the highest priorities for the countries that try to implement liberal 
economic policies after the failure of import substitution model in the 1970s.  
This part of the story resembles the Turkish experience considerably.  Just 
like Turkey, many Latin politicians opted for short-term economic assistance 
rather than facing the difficulty in implementing privatization policies since 
the public had a negative attitude due to the economic hardships. (Biglasier 
and Brown 2005: 671-680) 
 
Nina Bandelj (Bandelj: 2002) offers an interesting framework which 
emphasizes the role of social relations in FDI.  The starting point of the 
author is that previous research deemphasizes the role of the host countries 
while presenting them as passive receivers of FDI which is far from the case.  
Secondly, according to Bandelj the countries in Central and Eastern Europe 
which were evaluated as the most developed and least risky for investment 
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did not have the biggest share of FDI in the region.  Consequently the author 
comes up with a relation approach: 
 
In sum, prior research on the determinants of FDI flows focuses, 
without exception, on the effects of country characteristics. This 
research treats foreign investment markets as atomistic, assuming 
that economic actors are independent from one another. But actors 
"are so constrained by ongoing social relations, that to construe 
them as independent is a grievous misunderstanding" 
(Granovetter 1985:482). Nation-states are embedded - connected to 
each other through political relations, migration and trade flows, 
or associational alliances. These supra-organizational factors shape 
the choice of FDI locations and the size of investments. It is thus 
necessary to treat the relations between investor and host countries 
as influences on FDI.(Bandelj 2002:416) 
 
Here the most interesting point of the arguments goes as follows. In 
Central and Eastern Europe there are two types of institutional regulations 
that are relevant for FDI flows.  These are bilateral agreements and the 
framework of European Union. Interestingly, Bandelj argues that we have to 
emphasize political alliances more because such economic transactions do 
not take place in a vacuum but they are affected by the general atmosphere 
of international relations. The political alliances pave the way for information 
exchange which is the “sine qua non” for FDI decisions. Of course the 
existence of some other relational determinants such as organizational and 
interpersonal networks cannot be denied. However, for purposes of 
generalization and relevancy for the Turkish case I will be mostly dealing 
with the emphasis on the effects of political alliances. 
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The effects of political alliances can be considered as supra-
organizational factors which are based on the assumption that nation-states 
are embedded, in other words connected through political relations. 
Following this assumption in her research Bandelj looks at host-investor 
dyads. “Hosts are 11 countries of Central and Eastern Europe.  Investors are 
the world’s 20 largest foreign investors and any other country that invested 
at least $ 5 million between 1995 and 1997 in one Central or East European 
country.”(Bandelj 2002: 423) According to the model built by Bandelj, the 
most significant factor that affected FDI decisions seems to be the political 
stability which is also related to the political alliances a state is in.  What is 
even more interesting is the argument that institutional arrangements such 
as EU do not directly affect FDI in the case of Central and East European 
countries. 
 
Both BITs and EU agreements are official rules, or formal contracts. 
They regulate what is often a very context-specific practice of 
foreign direct investment, where formal provisions between the 
members of a country dyad are overridden by informal 
considerations, such as cultural knowledge, political connections 
between hosts and investors, or the presence of personal and 
business networks that facilitate information flows and promote 
certain investment opportunities over others.(Bandelj 2002:433) 
 
In the conclusion the author deduces that even if the research is region 
specific, it can be argued in general framework of economic globalization 
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these political ties may give flexibility and a range of options to choose 
between different FDI patterns; so that the hosts also have quite visible 
influences in the global market.   
 
We can argue that the institutional framework offered by the 
organization of the European Union may not have a direct effect on FDI but 
still it affects enormously in terms of increasing credibility of a certain host 
country and helps to build political and economic networks within the EU 
which helps the state to construct the most crucial ground for FDI.  This 
aspect was argued by Bandelj as a factor of political alliances and cultural 
resemblance. She uses this argument to refute the impact of EU when she 
looks at the economic parameters but I believe it can be used on the contrary. 
It is possible to argue that EU by offering the networks and political alliances 
affect FDI as we can see from the example of Romania.  By arguing that I do 
not disregard the economic reform aspect such a prospect includes like 
Bandelj doe but I try to combine it with the political aspect as I have already 
discussed in the previous chapter. A case in point is the difference between 
the Balkans and Central Europe. Due to their political alliances the instability 
during the transition period of the Central European countries were 
overlooked and in time decreased significantly as a result of the integration 
to EU. Balkans on the other hand due to their lower perspective of 
membership and high level of political instability remained to attract lower 
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FDI compared to their potential.(Kutan,Yiğit and Brada: 2006) In this respect, 
I would like to make a closer analysis of these transition economies by taking 
the example of Romania. 
 
4.1. Romania 
I decided to take Romania as an example of a transition economy with 
prospects of EU membership. FDI here is seen as a key tool operates to 
transform state socialism into free market democracy.  Therefore, it was 
crucial for integration to the global economy. According to many experts FDI 
was a main macroeconomic variable that affected key indicators such as 
employment rates and balance of payments together with the know-how to 
restructure the state owned economic enterprises. When we look at the 
general picture of FDI in Central and Eastern Europe we definitely see lots of 
significant variations.  These variations will be helpful to analyze Turkey as a 
case for FDI. 
 
Romania became a European Union member in 1 January 2007 together 
with Bulgaria after the application process to EU membership following 
Poland and Hungary. The accession date was set at the Thessaloniki Summit 
in 2003 and confirmed in  Brussels in 2004. 1990s were not very bright for 
Romania since she was suffering from political instability and also suffered 
taxes from the US between 1988 and 1994.  However, it seems that Romania 
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has recently enjoyed a boom economy with 6-7% rates of growth per year 
and becoming a major center for FDI in Central and Eastern Europe as a 
result of the accession process. In 1995, Romania became an Associated State 
of the EU and in the immediate aftermath till the point of full membership 
we see an upward swing in FDI flows. 
 
 
  
 
FDI inflows to the top 10 recipient 
countries in Central and Eastern Europe, 
1996 and 1997 
(in millions of U.S. dollars) 
 
Country 
1996 1997 
All Central and Eastern Europe total 13 074 19 114 
Russian Federation 2 452 6 241 
Poland 4 498 5 000 
Hungary 1 982 2 085 
Czech Republic 1 428 1 301 
Romania 265 1 224 
Ukraine 521 623 
Bulgaria 109 497 
Latvia 382 418 
Lithuania 152 355 
Croatia 533 348 
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Table 6: FDI inflows to the top 10 recipient countries in CEE in 1996-
1997 
 
Source: UNCTAD Press Release - 11 November 1998 
 
 
 
As can be seen from the table it is possible to make a rough 
differentiation between first movers and late comers to liberalization reforms 
in the region. In this picture Romania stands some where in the middle. 
Poland, Hungary and Czech Republic are not only well advanced in 
liberalization reforms and attracting FDI but compared to Romania they 
managed to enter EU at an earlier date which brought them a significant 
advantage. Geographically speaking this distinction reflects itself between 
Central and Southeastern European countries.  Of course one cannot ignore 
the impact of war and ethnic conflict in Southeastern Europe which affected 
countries such as Romania even if they did not participated in these conflicts.  
 
If we take another criterion for comparison, the data provided by World 
Investment Report on potential and performance FDI indexes of countries 
could be very helpful. I will take the year 2004 as a year of comparison since 
Romania started accession talks in February 2000, we will be able to see the 
effects of EU candidacy on more solid grounds. 
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2004 Inward FDI Performance Index 
Ranking 
Inward FDI Potential 
Index Ranking 
Turkey  115 68 
Romania  35 81* 
 
Table 7: FDI ranking, Romania and Turkey Comparison 
*This ranking is based on 2003 estimates, the lower the number the 
better in ranking 
 
Source: UNCTAD World Investment Report 2005 
 
Based on the table above, we can safely conclude that reforms 
undertaken by Romania for accession to European Union together with the 
progress in accession talks (even if there were some political ups and downs 
in the process) contributed to Romania’s performance which exceeds her 
potential by far. 
 
4.2. Argentina 
 
Argentina provides an interesting case study since being labeled as a 
promising emerging market it, has been seen in the top 10 of emerging 
markets by various economic authorities in terms of FDI attraction and 
expected growth rates. From this perspective it is comparable to Turkey in 
terms of market size and discourses of “big potential.” According to the 
statistics based on the year 2004 there is an interesting chart that ranks 
countries according to FDI potentials.  In this chart we see Turkey just 
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following Argentina, latter being 67 and former 68 in Inward FDI Potential 
Index. (UNCTAD 2006a)  However, when we look at the actual statistics we 
see a huge discrepancy in terms of realization of this potential and fall far 
behind in actual FDI. 
 
Consequently, the main focus of this section would be to see what 
Argentina achieved outside the influence of European Union as a developing 
country. I have chosen Argentina as an example comparable in market size 
and structural problems both of the economies face.  In the following decades 
of 1980s Turkey and Argentina followed more or less similar paths of crisis 
and high inflationary environments.  Both of the countries were presented as 
virgin grounds with potential yet unstable, both were under the guidance of 
IMF and had to sign stand-by programs to normalize their economies.  All of 
these economic factors also triggered political problems yet there remain also 
differences. One of such difference was the social outburst which was lacking 
in Turkey after the big crises of 2000 and 2001.  More importantly, what 
Turkey have in addition was the presence of EU as an important political 
anchor that helped to stabilize the political environment which had essential 
effects for the economy as well. One can argue that the US could have 
performed such an anchor role but the relations between the US and 
Argentina does not allow such a position and the US does not provide the 
same ground for commitment as EU provides for Turkey. 
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In the beginning of the 1980s Argentina was seen as an interesting 
country with a huge amount of debt while being a successfully growing 
economy. This Latin American developing state, just like Turkey, shared a 
period of economic liberalization led by military regimes after the failure of 
Import substitution Industrialization. 1970s was a period of ISI and political 
polarization of the society. Under the military rule between 1976 and 1983 
Argentina started to follow liberal economic policies which resemble the 
period that started with the October 24th decisions of liberalization in Turkey.  
In this period the intervention of the state to the economy started to decrease 
considerably in Argentina.  (Pillonel 2002: 53-57) 
 
However, early 1980s was a period of disillusionment with a huge 
foreign debt and a stagnating economy. (Stiles 1987: 57) Political instability 
started to increase and finally military regime came to an end with the end of 
the Falkland War with Britain. What followed 1983 in Argentina was a 
struggle towards democratization and liberalization.  All these efforts meant 
transformation of the state structure as well as the socio-economic structure.  
Therefore, on the political front, the path followed by both Turkey and 
Argentina seem to overlap. Argentina of late 1990s was dominated by 
political instability and yet when we came to the year 2001 the world was 
surprised to see such a major socio-economic crisis in Argentina.  Argentina 
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just like Turkey at the time was under IMF projection and the authorities 
were trying to implement strict fiscal policies. However, these measures were 
not enough and economic crisis hit Argentina hard.  Economic crisis turned 
into social and political crisis resulting in riots in the streets.  Since Turkey 
was also suffering from crisis environment, news in Turkish media also 
compared the case of Argentina with Turkey at the time with a motto of 
“Turkey will not be Argentina” 
 
Based on the World Investment Report 2007 the share of FDI in 
Argentinean economy  is more than 25%  when compared to total GDP in the 
years 2005 and 2006.(UNCTAD 2007)  These numbers are more than twice 
the case in Turkey.  World Investment Report again shows Turkey as a 
country that has a long way to go in terms of FDI’s share in the economy. 
The percentage of FDI compared to GDP remains at the level of 11.6 in the 
year 2005. (UNCTAD 2006b)  We already know that Argentina has been a 
country that has faced a far serious economic and social crisis at the year 
2002; nevertheless its FDI inflow level is far more than Turkey.  Although 
Argentina is more or less following the average of FDI attraction in the 
league of developing countries whereas Turkey ranking far under than the 
average, it is still a good case for comparison. (UNCTAD 2007) 
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Country FDI stocks as a percentage of 
GDP for 2005 
Argentina 29,7 
Turkey 11,6 
Average of Developing 
Countries 
27,0 
 
       Table 8: FDI stocks as a percentage of GDP in 2005 
       Source: World Investment Report 2006. UNCTAD, World Investment 
Report 2007; www.unctad.org/wir or www.unctad.org/fdistatistics. 
 
From another perspective things look rather negative for Argentina.  
Starting with late 1990s Argentina entered a period of recession and the 
beginning of the 21st century hit Argentina hard. Economic crisis let to social 
crisis and huge displacement and protests among the workers. Years of 2001 
and 2002 were marked by turmoil in the society and Argentinean politics.  
President Fernando de la Rua resigned on 20 December 2001, following amid 
violent street protests in which 25 people were killed. The subsequent 
political instability led to four presidents succeeding him in only 10 days. 
Soon bank accounts were frozen and the currency - the peso - was devalued, 
ending a decade-long fixed link with the US dollar.  In this period one of the 
biggest investors to Argentina, USA cut its investments and things started to 
normalize only starting with 2003. (Enders et.al. 2006:520) 
In 2002, Argentina defaulted on an $800m debt repayment to the 
World Bank, having failed to re-secure IMF aid and the World Bank 
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threatened to not to give further loans to Argentina. All these developments 
resulted in unstable and changing coalition governments in the political 
realm.  Only towards the end of 2003 Argentina managed to strike a deal 
with IMF.   Together with strict economic policies by the year 2006, 
Argentina repaid its multi-billion-dollar debt to the IMF. 
This picture of positive trends was due to the economic management, 
demand from the international markets and the peso’s cheapness. What are 
even more important are the indicators of foreign direct investment. When 
the crisis of 2001 in both Turkey and Argentina were compared from the 
perspective of international investors Turkey proved to be a much more 
reliable country with the support of IMF and European Union. However 
despite huge negative growth, economic indicators started to be more 
positive and together with the relative stability in the country FDI takes off 
once more.  Of course, Argentina has a long way to go before she realizes her 
“potential.” According to the data of 2006, Turkey manages to attract four 
times more FDI, Turkey attracting 20.1 billion dollars worth of FDI while 
Argentina remains at 4.8. (UNCTAD 2008) 
 What is interesting here in the situation of Argentina is that after such 
a collapse it again starts to attract investment.  In this respect, stability, 
economic reform and incentives granted by the hosting government once 
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again proves themselves as important variables to attract FDI as can be seen 
from the case of Argentina. 
 
4.3. Compare and Contrast 
 
 
Table 9: Inward FDI Performance Index 2004-2006 
Source: United Nations Conference on Trade and Development 
(UNCTAD) data 
 
 Table 9 can provide us a good starting point to discuss three of the 
countries together: Turkey, Romania and Argentina. Coming from different 
regions and backgrounds they offer quite different examples to determine 
the effects of country specific characteristics and relations with international 
actors. As I have mentioned before I have taken Romania and Argentina as 
examples from Central European and Latin American regions since they are 
comparable to Turkey in size, potential and political economic relations. 
 
As can be seen from the above table Romania stands as a success story 
mainly due to accession to European Union and reforms made for 
Inward FDI 
Performance Index 
2004-2006 
 
TURKEY 
 
ROMANIA 
 
ARGENTINA 
RANK 73 21 83 
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integration.  Argentina stands as a country that tries to get rid of the negative 
effects of 2001 crisis which was particularly harsh due to mismanagement 
and absence of a stabilizing anchor.  Turkey on the other hand seems to be 
standing somewhere in between, still trying to realize her potential.  
  
Turkey is in an advantageous position compared to Argentina since she 
managed to deal with the crisis better.  It is also undertaking major steps to 
reform the economy after having the bitter lessons of economic crisis.  
Starting with the year of 2003 Turkey has been spending more effort with 
more emphasis on FDI and together with the relatively more stable 
environment and start of the accession talks for EU membership, foreign 
direct investment is following a positive trend.  Still when we compare the 
share of FDI in the overall GDP ratio, it is less than half of developing 
countries together with Argentina. 
 
Romania on the hand is smaller if the size of the economy is concerned 
when compared to Turkey.  However, it provides a recent example of impact 
of EU on the economy in general and FDI in particular.  Romania has a far 
different background as a transition economy but it can be said that even if 
Turkey had early advantage in liberalization and democratization, Romania 
seems to have surpassed Turkey in these matters.  This has a direct effect on 
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FDI as a result of accession to European Union and getting a place in the 
European network of FDI. 
 
All in all, three of the cases point out to the fact that structure of the 
economy, privatization and liberalization, stability and international 
networks matter considerably when we discuss general trends of FDI 
inflows. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
        
 
 
 
 
 
61 
 
 
 
CHAPTER V 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 
In this thesis I have discussed different components of foreign direct 
investment inflows from the perspective of hosting countries.  I argued that 
political factors, among them especially the issue of stability, becomes a 
primary factor to attract FDI after a certain level of economic structuring is 
reached as has been the case with Turkey in recent years. EU membership is 
an important case that needs to be discussed not only from the perspective of 
economic reforms but also its anchor role in political stability. I also argued 
that the ambiguity in the negotiation talks is a serious disadvantage and if 
this ambiguity is lengthened, the process of negotiation can become a 
disadvantage for Turkey. To reach this conclusion I drew a general picture of 
FDI before discussing specific concerns about Turkey and then provided a 
comparison to highlight the role of the EU.  
 
Since foreign direct investment has been accepted as an important tool 
for the development of economies, it has taken particular attention by 
governments and there has been a huge competition to attract FDI.  In this 
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respect due to the political and economic structures of countries, there are 
certain advantages that reflect themselves as potentials of countries.  Turkey 
in this respect is one of the countries that are discussed in terms of her 
potential and failure to realize this potential. I have tried in the previous 
three chapters to discuss what can be the factors behind such a failure. To be 
able to analyze the roots of this failure, I combined political and economic 
factors and discussed drawbacks and improvements after 1999. In this 
process I paid particular attention to the European Union both as an actor 
and as an anchor in Turkey’s history of FDI.  
 
Among problems of Turkey concerning the low levels of foreign direct 
investment inflows we can count chronic high inflation, increasing economic 
instability, inward orientation until 1980, lack of privatization, failure to 
create incentives for investors, bureaucratic impediments, political instability 
and the fear of foreign domination of economy.  
  
Turkey experienced in the last five years a wave of privatization which 
had a considerable affect on FDI for two reasons.  Firstly, it was an indicator 
of commitment to liberalization.  Secondly and more importantly as can be 
seen in the FDI figures of 2004 and 2005 considerable amount of FDI Turkey 
attracted in these years are mainly led by privatization. 
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June 2003 is a breaking point in the history of FDI in Turkey. On 17 June 
2003, a new law, “Foreign Direct Investment Law”, was passed which 
abolished the necessity to have a permission to make FDI and turned into a 
system of disclosure. This new law that eases the bureaucratic operations, 
and assists to the creation of a more FDI-friendly environment, contributed 
to the increase in FDI inflow. Obstacle of legal instability can be said to 
overcome with this law, the structural reforms as a result of stand-by 
agreements and reforms to fulfill EU criteria. 
 
In fact reforms made to fulfill EU criteria were only one among many 
influences of EU on FDI inflows. European countries have a tendency to 
channel FDI within the borders of EU. Consequently EU membership is an 
important advantage for attracting FDI from EU countries. Signals of this 
advantage when coupled with the geographical position of Turkey showed 
itself in statistics of FDI in Turkey.   
 
Furthermore, prospective EU membership has been considered as an 
important political and economic anchor at times of crisis as can be seen in 
the comparison between Argentina and Turkey concerning the crisis in 2001. 
However, this is a mixed blessing. Membership talks have started and they 
proceed in a fluctuating pace. Due to political uncertainty on the part of the EU 
members about Turkish membership, the situation continues to be ambiguous 
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and this ambiguity is likely to be transformed into a disadvantage in time. As I 
have mentioned in the previous chapter three of the cases-Turkey, Romania 
and Argentina- point out to the fact that structure of the economy, 
privatization and liberalization, stability and international networks matter 
noticeably when we discuss general trends of FDI inflows. 
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